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CONFIDENTIAL

23 September 1952

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. KENT

SUBJECT: Mid-1954 Soviet Capabilities' Paper

1. You will recall that we have been on the hook, at least at NSC, for delivery by 1 October of a paper dealing with Soviet capabilities through mid-1954. The IAC Agencies agreed in August that this should be done as a supplement to NIE-64 (Part I).

2. Following the discussion at the Board meeting this morning, I consulted Mr. Gleason of the NSC as to the necessity and deadline for this paper. He reiterated the necessity, but stated that the deadline could be put off to 1 November in view of the fact that basic budgetary deadlines have been postponed beyond that time.

3. From an NSC standpoint, it is possible that another postponement will not destroy the effectiveness of the paper. But it would certainly have greatest impact if it could be out by 1 November.

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY

OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF, G-2, INTELLIGENCE
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

28 JUL 1952

MEMORANDUM FOR: Executive Secretary, Board of National Estimates,
Central Intelligence Agency

SUBJECT: NSC Requirement for Estimate of Soviet Bloc Capabilities
through Mid-1954

1. Reference is made to CIA memorandum, dated 23 July 1952,
subject as above.

2. It appears that the proposed procedure may be satisfactory
and G-2 tentatively agrees to it. However, the scope and content
of the preliminary draft of NIE-64, Part I, was not completely
satisfactory to G-2 nor, it is understood, to other agencies. It
is probable that the approved version of NIE-64, Part I, will differ
materially from the preliminary draft and subsequent draft versions.

3. It is feared that the showing of the preliminary draft to
the Executive Secretary of the NSC (as indicated in paragraph 3 of
the reference) may have created a false impression of the scope and
content of the document that the NSC will receive as NIE-64, Part I.
The Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, believes that Mr. Armstrong's
remarks reference SE-30 as briefed in paragraph 8, IAC-M-73, apply
to this case in general.

John W. Weckrell

JOHN WECKRELLING
Colonel General, G-2
Deputy ASAC, G-2

Review of this document by CIA has
determined that
☒ CIA has no objection to declass
It contains information of CIA
Interest that must remain
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Authority: HR 70-2
☐ If security is not
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(sgd) John Weckerling

JOHN WECKERLING
Brigadier General, GS
Deputy AC of S, G-2

NSC needs a paper thru 1964 =
w/ #6 & plus a Supplement to the trick
1) No other way to do it.

- 2) Diff from Berlin case (even assuming that was wrong)
a) Not to Senior Staff
b) Not for action.
- 3) Customary in many cases to review scope & form questions w. NSC Sec'y.
E.g. Ed Hoover on Vulnerability study.

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DI/USAF PRO-POSED CHANGES TO NIE-64 (Part I)

Reference page 1, paragraph 1, Change as follows:

" We estimate that the Bloc has the ~~military~~ capability to ~~oversee~~ conduct military operations concurrently against most of continental Europe, most of the middle East (except the Indian subcontinent and possibly Turkey), and most of mainland Asia. ~~in relatively short periods of time. However, we believe that the Bloc will not within the period of this estimate possess the capability to conduct these operations simultaneously.~~

2. Reference page 1, paragraph 2, Delete paragraphs and substitute new paragraphs "2 and 33:

"2" We estimate that the Spviet now have sufficient aircraft and crews to permit them to attempt to deliver in the United States all of the atomic stockpile they now have or will have during the period of this estimate.

"3" We believe that, despite definite improvements in Bloc Air Defense capabilities, the Bloc Air Defense system is not and during the period of this estimate will not be adequate to assure either Soviet Union or the other members of the Bloc a substantial degree of protection from air attack.

4. Reference page 2, Add new conclusion #4:

" The Bloc has substantial capabilities for the employment of atomic, chemical, and biological weapons for clandestine attack upon the United States.

5. Reference page 2, paragraph 3, Change number of paragraph to #5.

6. Reference page 2, paragraph 4, change as follows :

4. 6. We estimate that by mid-1953 Bloc armed forces will consist of approximately 8, 850, 000 men (including Soviet and Stillite security forces) and an estimated authorized strength of over 25, 000 aircraft, including ~~9, 850~~ 10, 000 jet fighters and ~~1, 225~~ 1, 150 medium bombers (1, 050 piston and ~~175~~ possibly 100 jet). *

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7. Reference page 2, paragraph 5, change number of paragraph to "7".
8. Reference page 3, paragraph 6, Change number of paragraph to "8".
9. Reference page 3, paragraph 7, change as follows:
 ~~¶. 9.~~ Bloc capabilities for political warfare will continue to constitute a serious danger for the Non-Communist world throughout the period of this estimate. The principal sources of strength upon which these capabilities are based consist of the ~~size, power and unity~~ At the Bloc military capability, unified political and economic control over vast and populous area of the Bloc, the fervent doctrinaire appeal of ~~Communist doctrine~~ communism, and the Communist international ational organization.
10. Reference page 3, paragraph 8, Change number of paragraph to "10".
11. Reference page 4, paragraph 9, first sentence, change as follows:
 ~~¶. 11.~~ Throughout the period of this estimate, the Bloc will retain a capability for harassing and confusing the Non-Communist world and for ~~working~~ exploiting weaknesses in its resolution and unity.

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12. Ref. page 7, para. 17. Delete this paragraph and add the following to paragraph 16:

"Soviet control of the Satellites, relations with Communist China and control over the international Communist movement, would probably not be seriously affected by the death of Stalin".

13. Ref. page 17, para. 33b. Add the following sentences after the present third and fourth sentences respectively:

"No true all-weather fighter is known to be in operational use, but such an aircraft may be operational by mid-1953". "There is no indication of the production of the Type 31 or other heavy bomber; however, this is within the capability of the USSR and we estimate that by mid-1953, a few aircraft of this type will probably be available for operational use."

14. Ref. page 18, para. 33c. Rewrite the last part of this paragraph from the fourth sentence on as follows:

"The USSR has demonstrated the ability to develop and to produce ~~increased quantities of airborne interception radar~~ improved early warning, ground control interception and blind bombing radars, and modern fire control radars. We estimate that this equipment will increase in quantity and quality during the period of this estimate. We also believe that some type of AI equipment will be produced in limited operational quantities during this period. The USSR has developed a very high capability for jamming radio ~~and radar~~ transmissions

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up to at least VHF frequencies. Radar jamming capabilities of any type have not been recently observed to any extent, but the USSR could probably have equipment available in limited quantities for jamming frequencies up to 3000 megacycles by mid-1953.

15. Ref. page 19, para. 33d. ^{See also change #17} ~~Delete sub-~~
paragraphs 1 and 2 and substitute as follows:

1. Surface-to-air missiles employing radar command and proximity fuzing capable of a maximum horizontal range of 12 nautical miles and a maximum altitude capability of over 60,000 ft.
2. Air-to-air missiles with visual guidance, proximity fuzing, and estimated to have a maximum horizontal range of 2 nautical miles.
3. Air-to-surface missiles with improved accuracy and range (approx. 10 nautical miles), employing radar or television and radio command guidance. No homing capability is expected during the period of this estimate.

16. Ref. page 24, para. 40. Change first sentence as follows:

"On the basis of extremely fragmentary data, we estimate that the planned allocation of Soviet resources to military production in 1952 will represent some 23 percent of the gross national production as compared to the 17 percent planned for 1951. ~~An increase of from 30 to 40 percent over the 1951 allocation.~~

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17. Page 19 para. 34, delete first and second sentences and substitute as follows: "Available information on Soviet missile guidance and control projects is not sufficient to indicate the specific nature of the projects under investigation, the degree of success achieved, or the trend which developments can be expected to take. The Soviets have demonstrated an ability to produce electronic-navigational equipment, however, and it may be assumed that they are working on further developments of the projects they acquired from the Germans."

18. Page 35 para. 63, delete the last sentence and change second sentence as follows: "We estimate that the Bloc has the capability to ~~overrun~~ conduct military operations concurrently against most of continental Europe, most of the Middle East (except the Indian subcontinent and possibly Turkey), and most of mainland Asia. ~~in relatively short periods of time.~~"

19. Page 36 para. 66, commencing with the second sentence change as follows: " However, we estimate that this capability is and will be during the period of this estimate limited by ~~because of~~ the size of the Soviet atomic stockpile ~~and because of~~ as well as the limited capabilities of Soviet Long-Range Aviation. ~~the USSR.....estimate.~~"

20. Page 36 para. 67, Change as follows: " The air defense capabilities of the USSR have increased substantially since 1945. ~~and we believe that an air offensive against the principal Soviet centers would encounter vigorous and determined opposition. However,~~ Despite these ~~the~~ marked improvements ~~in Soviet air defense capabilities,~~ deficiencies still exist. Therefore, within the period of this estimate, the Soviet and satellite air defense system will ~~almost certainly~~ not be adequate to assure a

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21. Page 37 para. 68, delete last sentence and change first as follows:
"We believe that the Bloc has the capability of severing assaulting a
beachhead on Hokkaido and/or possibly Honshu with approximately 8 to 12
waterborne divisions and 5-800 transports for airlift operations during
the period of this estimate."
22. Page 37, para. 69, rewrite paragraph as follows: "The Soviet Far
Eastern submarine fleet and air forces could launch attacks on "estern
shipping in the northern and western Pacific and upon US bases in those
areas and in Alaska. By mid-1953, the Soviet forces may have the capability
of severing, at least intermittently, Western lines of communications to
those bases and even of possibly neutralizing the more forward US bases."
23. Page 45, para. 82, line 5-8. Delete sentence "Approx.—Viet Minh"and
Substitute: "The larger national parties are those in Italy (1,500,000),
France (50,000), West Germany (127,000), Japan (100,000), India (50,000)
and the UK (30,000)".
24. Page 52, para 95, add as continuation of paragraph. "The Bloc will,
however, continue to possess the capability to wage political campaigns
through the activities of certain indigenous political parties whose
policies in many cases, tend to favor Soviet objectives (West Germany,
(UK) by means of cultural societies in conjunction with domestic policies
(Sweden), and by utilization of border pressures and traditional national
rivalries (Greece, Yugoslavia) and by economic enticements (Austria)"
25. Page 54, para 98. Delete paragraph and substitute as follows:
"In Iran the Bloc agent, the Tudeh Party, has an estimated membership of

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45,000 and has exploited the current situation with increasing success. The Government has thus far been able to keep Tudeh from completely attaining its objectives, although it has not been able to prevent some infiltration by Tudeh into the Armed Forces and the bureaucracy. Communist political warfare capabilities are increasing dangerously under present social and economic dislocations. The effectiveness of the armed forces and the police has been weakened as have the prestige and power of the Shah. The result is, if present conditions are not improved, The Communists may well acquire control of Iran within the period of this estimate. If general war should break out, Tudeh capabilities would almost certainly be increased by the influx of Iranian Communists presently in the USSR and of other Soviet agents.

26. Page 56, para 102. Add new sentence as follows: "The ICP's position and strength will also depend on the reaction of the Indian government toward World Communism as a result of events in Korea, Tibet, Nepal and Kashmir."

TAB "A"

27. Page 11; para 20, change last sentence and add new sentence as follows: "Although a heavy bomber appeared in the July 1951 air show, there is no evidence ~~that this bomber was an acceptable one as~~ that series production of any heavy bomber has begun. If such production is actually underway, The Soviets are estimated to be capable of having small numbers in operational units by mid-1953.

28. Page 15, para 24b, delete fifth and sixth sentences and substitute:

"Upon the basis of present evidence, it is considered likely that the Soviets have a few interim all-weather aircraft equipped with AI radar on

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an experimental basis, but there is no evidence that AI radar is available for use in operational interceptor units. The limited evidence pointing to Soviet possession of AI type radar, however, is considered a significant indication of their efforts to improve further their air defense capability. The current intercept capability of Soviet fighter units ranges from effective under daylight conditions to insignificant under all-weather conditions, with the degree of visibility having a direct bearing on the degree of effectiveness."

Page 17 para. 24,c,(2), change second sentence as follows: Delete ~~"missions"~~ to

~~SENTENCE~~ "Available evidence is not sufficient to indicate the extent to

which Soviet Long-Range Aviation may now be capable of undertaking strategic

bombing missions by day or night in any weather, although it is undergoing

an intensive training program is known to be underway.

Change fifth sentence as follows: "The average Soviet medium bomber crew is considered to be less skilled than the average US medium bomber crew of

World War II although selected crews probably could, within limitations imposed by equipment, approach standards obtained by the present average among US counterparts."

Page 26 para 40, delete second sentence and substitute as follows: "Night interception capabilities have improved through increased pilot proficiency and improved GCI operations; however, this capability is limited to good night visibility conditions due to the lack of operational AI equipment. Soviet all-weather interception capabilities are still seriously limited, although the USSR may now have on an experimental basis in a few key areas, a small number of interim all-weather aircraft equipped with some type of airborne interception equipment."

31. Page 27 para 41, change last five lines as follows: "... increasing numbers around most important Soviet ~~targets~~ cities. These guns are considered to be capable of accurate fire up to 35-40,000 feet depending upon the effectiveness of the crews and the fire control equipment, the technical characteristics of which are not known. A 57 mm gun for attacking high speed aircraft at lower altitudes may already have been introduced however, available evidence does not provide sufficient basis for estimating ~~THE NUMBER WHICH MAY BE OPERATIONAL~~. Surface-to-air guided missiles and unguided rockets in limited numbers ~~may~~ could be in operational use by mid-1953."

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